Threat to the United States Unity. The Supreme Court's Perversion of the Constitutional Supremacy.

This post is about a shameful Supreme Court’s decision F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) where the Supreme Court denied the U.S. Constitution as a Supreme Law of the land. Subsequently, ruining the constitutional structure created by James Madison crafting the provisions of the U.S. Constitution to prevent tyranny similar to Britain at that time here, in the U.S.

When I first time run into this decision while litigating my pro se case in Federal District Court, I could not realize why the whole legal community tacitly admitted this erroneous and shameful Supreme Court’s decision and don’t fight legally against it as much as possible? To me, this decision (in its pertaining part relevant to the topic in this post) is very disturbing because the Supreme Court factually decided that the U.S. law may be enacted not in pursuance of Constitution but neglecting it, that inevitably presumes that all the rights guaranteed by the U.C. Constitution to people also may be disregarded. That Supreme Court's decision denigrates the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the land turning the U.S. federal system on the way of usurping the power and totalitarism.

I have to admit, if you’re not into legal stuff or the U.S. law, probably, this post will be boring for you. So, let’s get started…

It is axiomatic principle that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 77 L. Ed. 2d 580, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983) 

In 1946 the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was enacted providing a legal means for compensating individuals who have suffered personal injury, death, or property loss or damage caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the federal government.

So, under the FTCA, the United States consented to waive sovereign immunity for claims of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

I emphasized this particular part of the statute for a specific purpose – this post revolves around the Supreme Court's erroneous and dangerous, to my opinion, legal interpretation of this particular part of the statute. Let's delve into the precise meaning of the collocation 'the law of the place' based on the genuine structure of United States law.

FOREWORD.

In 2021 I, as a pro se litigant, initiated legal procedures to reimburse $38mln from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for false administrative arrest committed by them in late 2018. That false arrest entailed by the unlawful deportation order, 525 days of illegal immigration detention, and all accompanied financial losses inflicted to me and my Hi-Tech business.

My Hi-Tech business was - a cryptocurrency mining farm in Reno, Nevada scored as 23-26th in the world that I established right before those events. I invested in it almost all my lifesavings collected throughout my life. Up only to the year of 2021 my farm would have brought to the U.S. Federal and State budgets approximately $2.5mln in taxes, had the DHS exercised its power lawfully as prescribed by statutes and federal regulations. The factual events of my arrest you can read here. All legal grounds or, more precisely, their non-existence I explained in this post earlier.

So, when I eventually was released from 525-days-lasting unlawful immigration detention, I found out that my business was destroyed, and all my investments lost. Beside losses in business, my credit history collapsed to the ground because of by sudden arrest I breached the leasing agreement for my apartment that I rented, and the real estate company put derogatory on my credit history record. The same was with a couple of credit cards, the payments on which I missed. So without doing anything against the law or even simply wrong, I lost everything because of political agenda against immigrants at that time.

So, I decided to find a legal way to reimburse all my losses. Such a way, as it turned out, was Federal Tort Claims Act.

After the DHS denied my administrative claim SF-95 for damage, I filed a lawsuit under Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C. § 2401 against the United States. It must be noted that under this statute the United States goes as a sort of insurance company by bearing its responsibilities for all federal employees' negligence, omissions and wrongful acts. Therefore, within the complaint filed with the Federal District Court, the party, which is opposite to me, as prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be - the United States, not the United States federal agency or employees themselve. So the case Grigorii Duralev v. United States of America emerged.

FTCA, CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY.

Among all other complex issues for litigation accompanying complaints under FTCA, I was really surprised to the core of my mind that while the federal government with all its agencies exist and allowed to exercise their power over the people only in a strict adherence of the United States Constitution however, there is no remedy to find them accountable if they violated the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. At least, that is how the Supreme Court interpreted the waiver enacted by the U.S. Congress in its following part that I have already cited earlier - that the United States waived sovereign immunity for claims of personal injury or death caused by the federal government's negligence under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant 'in accordance with the law of the place' where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)”

Thus, the Supreme Court in its decision F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) weirdly jumped in the conclusion that under the collocation ‘the law of the place’ ostensibly the Congress did realy mean ‘the law of the state,’ in other words, the law that enacted by the State's lagislature. After that, all federal Courts have been dismissing all causes of actions within FTCA complaints that raised Constitutional tort violations against U.S. federal employees. To me, it is extremely weird, keeping in mind that the United States Constitution is the Supreme law of the Land (See Article VI, Clause 2) under the United States's jurisdiction. The Constitutional Supremacy, including its operation and enforceability, cannot exist for one purpose and does not exist for another.

In my FTCA complaint I decisively contended that conclusion and interpretation of the statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) made by the Supreme Court in F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) was as much factually and legally erroneous as were conclusions in the infamous decision Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), where Supreme Court, erroneously declared that Black people ostensibly were not citizens under the U.S. Constitution. The inferences in F.D.I.C. v. Meyer were based on the erroneous departure from the principles which have been existing for decades for the statutory language interpretation.

Factually, the conclusion made on pertaining matter in F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, allowed the Congress to invoke statutes that would deny the operation, force and applicability of the Supreme law of the Land – the U.S. Constitution, which none of the branches of the United States power created under the U.S. Constitution has authority to deny until (at least) the present version of the Constitution existing for 235 years is abolished by the will of the People of the United States.

In my case all events occurred in California. Thus, to my opinion, which I expounded before the District Court and now in my Opening Brief before the Ninth Circuit, if the United States along with the Federal Courts still consider the place on which California State is situated as its land then, any Laws of the United States, including 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), must have been enacted in pursuance of the United States Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2), and all Senators and Representatives who enacted the FTCA in 1946 were bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution (Article VI, Clause 3) within the process of enacting the FTCA waiver.

Therefore, either the Supreme Court considered all legislators who were involved in enaction of the FTCA in 1946 as they were all traitors of the highest oath because they did not enacted the FTCA in pursuance of the U.S. Constitution, as the Supreme Court in F.D.I.C. v. Meyer implied by its erroneous rationale or, they could not made unconstitutional statute denying the operation, applicability and enforceability of the United States Constitution as the Supreme Law of the land over the place where the California is situated.

The erroneous simplification of the interpretation of the legal language in the pertaining statute made by F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, as linguistically erroneous as with the same success the phrase that the Constitution is the Supreme “Law of the Land" should also be interpreted as that the Constitution is the Supreme “Land law" that would obviously denigrate the Constitutional significance because has utterly different meaning for any prudent and reasonable person.

MY LEGAL ANALYSIS ON PERTAINING ISSUE.

Thus, the crux of the matter is the interpretation of the word “place” in the phrase “the law of the place” within the following excerpt of the statute – “… where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1346(b).

For the beginning, in far 1901 the Supreme Court itself held in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 385, 21 S. Ct. 770, 824 (1901):

"The Constitution is supreme over every foot of territory, wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of the United States, and its full operation cannot be stayed by any branch of the Government in order to meet what some may suppose to be extraordinary emergencies. If the Constitution is in force in any territory, it is in force there for every purpose embraced by the objects for which the Government was ordained."

It was held emphatically and clear – “…every foot of territory, wherever situated under the jurisdiction of the United States and its full operation cannot be stayed by any branch of the Government…” and I assert that the legislative branch of the Federal Government could not stay the full operation of the Constitution when they voted for enacting the FTCA. Therefore, the Constitution is “in force for every purpose” including the FTCA claims for the creation of which, the Congress as a legislative branch of federal power was ordained.

However, let's delve into what the Supreme Court itself insists on a statutory language interpretation: It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction” that, “unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S. Ct. 311, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979) To determine a word's plain and ordinary meaning, we may refer to standard English language dictionaries. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1993). “We note that the definition of the word "place" given in Webster's Dictionary refers repeatedly to spatial location as the core meaning of that term” United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Alaska 1983).

Undoubtedly, we use the word “place” as a noun to point out a “location” in its widest meaning including all features that would narrow or specify the meaning of the word ‘place’ such as: land or water; this country or that country; state or tribal area, countryside, or urban zone etc... Thus, by replacing the word ‘place’ with any other locational term we would limit the genuine meaning of the word ‘place’ for more specific spatial features. However, in our ordinary, plain, and contemporary perception we never use the word “place” to express any notion relating to the legislative structure at that place that we mean. For example, if anyone offers “let’s meet at some place”, no person thinks about the ‘place’ in the meaning of the legislative structure over that place but rather all would think how to get to that location.

Therefore, any replacement of the Congressional statutory language to the term narrowing the genuine meaning of the word used in statute changes the meaning of the statute and confronts with the Congressional intent. See:

"“…the general rule that "Congress' choice of words is presumed to be deliberate," Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338,  353, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 186 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013), and the Court therefore declines to treat the broad term "relating to" as  synonymous with a narrower term like "for." Cf. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 156 F. Supp. 3d 36, 44 (D.D.C. 2016)(declining to treat the "broader" term "matter in controversy" as synonymous with "case" in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) where Congress "easily could have substituted" the former with the latter (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2004))).” United States v. King, No. 22-137 (RC), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212629, at *9 n.4 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2023)

          Thus, when the Congress enacted the FTCA, it used a word “place” with its broadest meaning in its pertaining part – “in accordance with the law of the place” See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1346(b). The Congress deliberately used the precise word – “place”, not state, not tribal lands, not city or water etc. The Congress did it to emphasize the all variety of laws in its widest applicability without limiting it with any jurisdictional meaning that might have indeed changed the meaning of the statute.

This Congress' deliberate choice to use a precise widest word 'place' become even more obvious after learning the decision Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 382, 21 S. Ct. 770 (1901). In this decision Honorable Justice Harlan, in the dissenting opinion mentioned the session of the Constitutional Convention discussing on the phraseology regarding the definition of the supremacy of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.

Around that time, the United States had been growing by the territories acquired by purchase or conquest. Those territories and places had been in uncertain status until the legal process of ratification of the treaties ended. Therefore, the formulations of the context mattered a lot. The precise word formulation was vital because by the express words of the Constitution, every Senator and Representative was bound, by oath or affirmation, to regard it as the supreme law of the land.

Thus, Honorable Justice Harlan emphasized: That the Convention struck out the words "the supreme law of the several States" and inserted "the supreme law of the land," is a fact of no little significance. The "land" referred to manifestly embraced all the peoples and all the territory, whether within or without the States, over which the United States could exercise jurisdiction or authority.” Id at 824

The Honorable Chief Justice Fuller added: "And, as Mr. Justice Curtis observed in United States v. Morris, 1   Curtis, 23, 50, "nothing can be clearer than the intention to have the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States in equal force throughout every part of the territory of the United States, alike in all places, at all times." Id at 816.

As it vividly seen the Congress deliberately struck out the words “several States” in favor of the wider term “land” to emphasize that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of all territory over which the United States could exercise its jurisdiction or authority.

Moreover, the conclusive and convincing opinion upon this matter was held as far as in 1875 by Honorable Justice Swayne delivering opinion of the Supreme Court in Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 35: “It must always be borne in mind that the Constitution of the United States, "and the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof," are "the supreme law of the land" (Const., art. 6), and that this law is as much a part of the law of each State, and as binding upon its authorities and people, as its own local constitution and laws.”

Thus, even if the "law of the place" would deem “the law of the State,” as was mentioned in FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, however, in a view of paramount structure of the U.S. legal system, the Constitution “is as much a part of the law of each State, and as binding upon its authorities and people” Id. As such, to limit the statutory interpretation of the connotation “the law of the place” only by the law enacted by the legislature of the particular state it is irrational and erroneous conclusion undermining the authority and ability of the Supreme Court to protect the Supreme Law of the Land.

The Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution is very clear:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall  be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

So, all Senators and Representatives simply could not create the statute that was made not “in Pursuance thereof the force of the United States Constitution Art VI, Cl. 2. Because under U.S. Constitution Art. VI, Cl. 3 they were all bound by the “oath or affirmation” to always support the United States Constitution force and operation.

Any conclusions made otherwise would imply that all officials, by enacting a law applicable to a place in the United States but excluding the force and operation of the U.S. Constitution over that place in this law, automatically become traitors of the highest oath, a belief I consider untrue. Therefore, nothing in the genuine Congressional language of the statute 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) prevents Federal Courts from exercising their jurisdiction over the Constitutional Tort claim for liability under FTCA if they really believe in the people's rights.

CONCLUSION.

In recent Supreme Court decision Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1989 (2019) in concurring to Honorable Justice Alito’s opinion, Honorable Justice Thomas said, after providing an explicit analysis of stare decisis doctrine adherence:

"If a prior decision demonstrably erred in interpreting such a law, federal judges should exercise the judicial power—not perpetuate a usurpation of the legislative power—and correct the error. A contrary rule would permit judges to “substitute their own pleasure” for the law. The Federalist No. 78, at 468; see id., at 466 (“‘[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers’”)." at 1985

He concluded:

"Our judicial duty to interpret the law requires adherence to the original meaning of the text. For that reason, we should not invoke stare decisis to uphold precedents that are demonstrably erroneous." Id., at 1989.

After the proposed analyses, it has become clear that there is simply no room for such an irrational and erroneous conclusion that the Supreme Court made in FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 and all certified attorneys and federal Judges blindly follow without fighting legally for the Supreme law of the Land that was denied without any authorities to do so by the Supreme Court.

Helpful Links:

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Therefore, to my humble but assertive immigrant opinion who is representing himself in federal Courts, regarding the liability under FTCA, the collocation “the law of the place” may not be limited by the law enacted by State legislature exclusively and all Constitutional Claims must be heard under FTCA.

So, as I mentioned at the beginning, the Supreme Court's findings on pertaining matters in F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) are as erroneous and frightening. Therefore, I truly believe that sooner or later, the place in the "Hall of Shame" is waiting for this decision.

POSTSCRIPTUM.

The current events underscore the critical public importance of these questions. When the highest authorities of the United States Federal Government veer away from adhering to the paramount principle of the Supremacy of the U.S. Constitution in order to escape accountability for constitutional violations, and when such actions find advocacy in the Supreme Court's groundless rationale, it would not be surprising if the conflict appeared nowadays between the Texas State and Federal Government might spread over the other states.

Indeed, look at the Constitution Preamble:

"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." See Preable

So, 'the People of the United States' by their will agreed to unite, ordain and establish the Constitution for the United States, on condition that it would become the Supreme Law of all Land under the jurisdiction of Unity. By the provisions of the Constitution 'the People of the United States' agreed to create the Federal Government and ather tires of federal power however, bound them by oath or affirmation to support the Supreme Law of the Land and granted them to make other laws only in a pursuanse of the Constitution. See what Chief Justice Marshall well known as a principal founder of the U.S. system of constitutional law held in far 1803 in decision Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803):

"The particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."

So, it is not clear how the Supreme Court in 1994, could make such a shamefull to the Supreme Court's reputation findings. Because the voluntary denial of the full force and operation of the U.S. Constitution as the Supreme Law of the place where all States of Unity are situated, and under which the People of the United States in 1787 agreed to unite and ordain all tires of the Federal power, poses a significant risk to the fundamental principles underpinning the nation's unity.

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